“Through love of having children, we are going to take over.”
"These maternity hotels are normally single-family homes in
our neighborhoods that host numerous pregnant foreigners for months at a time,
violating local zoning laws and putting an undue burden on our neighborhoods,
hospitals and local governments," he wrote.
"Rarely do these maternity hotels have the ability to care
for ill mothers and/or their babies, resulting in hospital visits that unfairly
come at the cost of the American taxpayers."
LA RAZA-OCCUPATION and LOOTING in MEXIFORNIA…. shocking!
“Californians bear an enormous fiscal
burden as a result of an illegal alien population estimated at almost 3 million
residents. The annual expenditure of state and local tax dollars on services
for that population is $25.3 billion. That total amounts to a yearly burden of
about $2,370 for a household headed by a U.S. citizen.”
Americans (Legals) have become a
passive society while Mexico loots and occupies.
Here’s what the Democrat Party and
Mexico have done to CA.
CALIFORNIA: MEXICO’S
LOOTED
WELFARE STATE
WELFARE STATE
Patriots in Murrieta,
CA Fight Obama’s Alien Invasion
LA RAZA
POLITICIANS ELECTED BY ILLEGALS IN MEXIFORNIA: WHERE LA RAZA LOOTS FIRST!
August 31, 2015
An Objective
Guide to Birthright Citizenship
This is a guide to the constitutional issue of whether a child is
a citizen if born in the United States to alien parents here illegally.
If you are simply looking for arguments to bolster your political views,
look elsewhere. If you are genuinely interested in the merits of this
issue, keep reading.
The Fourteenth Amendment became
part of the Constitution in 1868. Its first clause states that
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state in
which they reside."
Although some claim that merely being born in the U.S. makes one a
citizen, neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court supports that view. The Fourteenth
Amendment further specifies that one must be "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States. The critical question is whether
the child of a resident illegal alien meets that requirement.
Anyone who tells you this is an easy question is not telling you
the truth. It is an extraordinarily difficult question.
What makes it difficult is not merely the politically and racially
charged atmosphere surrounding it. What makes it difficult are problems
common to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. The rest of the
Constitution has many clauses that may seem obscure initially yet become clear
in the light of contemporaneous law and history. But the Fourteenth
Amendment is filled with endless fodder for dispute.
This is partly because we know less than we should about the
amendment's ratification by the state legislatures. It is partly because
the amendment's congressional drafters were not very competent. They
sometimes were ignorant of existing constitutional law. They invented
terms without defining them. And they ascribed meanings to terms
different from established legal meanings. The phrase "subject to
the jurisdiction" is a good example. We have only a few clues as to
its intended meaning.
Additionally, none of the proposers discussed how the amendment
would impact the children of illegal aliens – even though (contrary to modern
assertion) everyone knew that such children were in the country. They
were the offspring of Africans illegally imported as slaves after the ban on
the slave trade (1808) and before the end of slavery (1866).
The Supreme Court has addressed the Fourteenth Amendment's
"subject to the jurisdiction" language in three important cases.
None of these cases definitively resolves our question. But they
offer hints.
Elk v. Wilkins (1884) was decided
before Congress extended citizenship to Indians who remained tribal members.
In Elk, the Court ruled that an Indian born into a tribe was
not a citizen unless naturalized under a statute or treaty. The Elk case
is only weak evidence of the rule applied to foreigners. This is because
the Constitution's text and history suggest that the citizenship standards for
tribal Indians and foreigners are different. However, the Elk case
does tell us that:
* "Subject to the jurisdiction" in the Fourteenth
Amendment has a specialized meaning, different from the common meaning of
"within a given territory and therefore subject to a court's order."
* This meaning is connected to the concept of
"allegiance," a legal term traditionally used to determine whether a
person is a natural born citizen.
* For deciding whether a child born in the U.S. receives
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant issue is the parents'
allegiance when the child was born. The parents' or child's later
decisions are irrelevant, unless the United States accepts them by statute or
naturalization ceremony.
Two justices dissented from the holding in Elk.
They accepted the connection between "jurisdiction" and
allegiance. But they argued that an Indian becomes a citizen if he
changes his allegiance by abandoning his tribe and becoming a member of his
state's political community. Their version of allegiance thus depended
partly on a person's intent.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) ruled that
the U.S.-born child of two legally resident foreigners was a natural born
citizen. Horace Gray, the same justice who wrote for the Court in Elk,
also wrote for the Court in Wong. The result was different
in Wong primarily because the Constitution implicitly made it
easier for foreigners to get automatic citizenship than tribal Indians.
But the underlying approach of Elk and Wong was
similar in that citizenship by birth depended more on geography than subjective
intent.
The most important lesson of Wong was this: the
Constitution's version of "allegiance" was the version we inherited
from Great Britain in 1776 – not versions prevailing in other countries or
under international law. This agrees with the independent conclusion in
my book, The Original Constitution: What It
Actually Said and Meant.
As modified by parliamentary statute, the British version of
allegiance was as follows:
* Birth in a country (or on a country's ships) normally creates a
"natural allegiance" to that country.
* A child born abroad is in allegiance to a country, and is
therefore natural born, only if his father is a citizen of
that country and not engaged in treasonous or felonious activities. In
Anglo-American law, a person's status usually followed that of the mother, but
for allegiance the rule was partus sequitur patrem.
* Foreign residents and visitors generally are in "local
allegiance" to the host country, since they submit themselves to its laws
and protection. Their children born in the host country are natural born
citizens of that country.
* To this last rule, there are two exceptions: When the father is
a foreign diplomat or a foreign invader, he has no allegiance to the host
country, and his offspring are not citizens.
Two justices dissented in Wong. They argued that
the British version of allegiance should not apply in America. They
contended that parents in merely local allegiance should not bestow
citizenship. For example, they stated that if a foreign power occupied
U.S. territory, the natural allegiance of parents should pass U.S. citizenship
to their children, even if those parents had a local duty to obey the
conqueror.
In my view, the Wong majority was right to hold
that the British version of allegiance applies to the original Constitution.
But because of developments between 1789 and 1868, the dissent made a
good argument that a newer, American version applied to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court's third case was Plyler v. Doe (1982).
It ruled that a state's treatment of illegal aliens' children is
controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The
"subject to the jurisdiction" phrase was not at issue.
Nonetheless, the strongly liberal majority inserted a footnote reading in part:
Nonetheless, the strongly liberal majority inserted a footnote reading in part:
As one early commentator noted, given the
historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by
principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect
to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident
aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose
entry was unlawful.
In my opinion, this footnote has little or no persuasive power.
It merely recited the views of a commentator and was irrelevant to the
matter under decision.
So where does that leave us?
Let's assume that the Court does not overrule the Elk and Wong cases.
To rule against "birthright" citizenship, the Court would have
to find a third exception to the precept that children born in the U.S. are
U.S. citizens.
Those arguing in favor of citizenship will argue against another
exception. They may point out that, unlike a diplomat or an invader, an
alien who has violated immigration law still a duty to honor other U.S. laws.
In other words, unlike the diplomat or invader, the alien owes local
allegiance, and a father's local allegiance should be enough to grant
citizenship to his child.
Citizenship advocates also can point out that unlike in Elk,
our country has largely accepted the children of illegal aliens. Our
officials generally let them stay in the country and even provide government
benefits, such as drivers' licenses and public university tuition preferences.
Finally, advocates may argue that although the diplomatic and
tribal Indian exceptions were mentioned during the Fourteenth Amendment
debates, there was no mention of an exception for the children of Africans
illegally imported. This implies that such an exception does not exist.
Opponents of citizenship may compare the illegal alien to the
foreign invader whose mate produces a child in occupied territory. Both
enter the country illegally, and neither should profit from his own wrong.
This is different from the case of the captured slave, who is guilty of
no wrong. Opponents can add that official acceptance of residence is not
the same as acceptance of citizenship.
They may try to prove that illegal aliens often show no interest
in abandoning their original citizenship. Opponents may then argue that
the Wong dissent was correct to consider personal attitudes as
well as mere geographic location.
These questions will be vigorously litigated, as they should be.
My current bet is for the Court to rule in favor of citizenship.
Rob Natelson is senior fellow in constitutional
jurisprudence at the Independence Institute in Denver and author of The Original
Constitution: What It Actually Said and Meant. His research
is cited frequently in Supreme Court opinions and arguments.
This is a guide to the constitutional issue of whether a child is
a citizen if born in the United States to alien parents here illegally.
If you are simply looking for arguments to bolster your political views,
look elsewhere. If you are genuinely interested in the merits of this
issue, keep reading.
The Fourteenth Amendment became
part of the Constitution in 1868. Its first clause states that
"[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state in
which they reside."
Although some claim that merely being born in the U.S. makes one a
citizen, neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court supports that view. The Fourteenth
Amendment further specifies that one must be "subject to the
jurisdiction" of the United States. The critical question is whether
the child of a resident illegal alien meets that requirement.
Anyone who tells you this is an easy question is not telling you
the truth. It is an extraordinarily difficult question.
What makes it difficult is not merely the politically and racially
charged atmosphere surrounding it. What makes it difficult are problems
common to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment. The rest of the Constitution
has many clauses that may seem obscure initially yet become clear in the light
of contemporaneous law and history. But the Fourteenth Amendment is
filled with endless fodder for dispute.
This is partly because we know less than we should about the
amendment's ratification by the state legislatures. It is partly because
the amendment's congressional drafters were not very competent. They
sometimes were ignorant of existing constitutional law. They invented
terms without defining them. And they ascribed meanings to terms
different from established legal meanings. The phrase "subject to
the jurisdiction" is a good example. We have only a few clues as to
its intended meaning.
Additionally, none of the proposers discussed how the amendment
would impact the children of illegal aliens – even though (contrary to modern
assertion) everyone knew that such children were in the country. They
were the offspring of Africans illegally imported as slaves after the ban on
the slave trade (1808) and before the end of slavery (1866).
The Supreme Court has addressed the Fourteenth Amendment's
"subject to the jurisdiction" language in three important cases.
None of these cases definitively resolves our question. But they
offer hints.
Elk v. Wilkins (1884) was decided
before Congress extended citizenship to Indians who remained tribal members.
In Elk, the Court ruled that an Indian born into a tribe was
not a citizen unless naturalized under a statute or treaty. The Elk case
is only weak evidence of the rule applied to foreigners. This is because
the Constitution's text and history suggest that the citizenship standards for
tribal Indians and foreigners are different. However, the Elk case
does tell us that:
* "Subject to the jurisdiction" in the Fourteenth
Amendment has a specialized meaning, different from the common meaning of
"within a given territory and therefore subject to a court's order."
* This meaning is connected to the concept of
"allegiance," a legal term traditionally used to determine whether a
person is a natural born citizen.
* For deciding whether a child born in the U.S. receives
citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, the relevant issue is the parents'
allegiance when the child was born. The parents' or child's later
decisions are irrelevant, unless the United States accepts them by statute or
naturalization ceremony.
Two justices dissented from the holding in Elk.
They accepted the connection between "jurisdiction" and
allegiance. But they argued that an Indian becomes a citizen if he
changes his allegiance by abandoning his tribe and becoming a member of his
state's political community. Their version of allegiance thus depended
partly on a person's intent.
United States v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) ruled that
the U.S.-born child of two legally resident foreigners was a natural born
citizen. Horace Gray, the same justice who wrote for the Court in Elk,
also wrote for the Court in Wong. The result was different
in Wong primarily because the Constitution implicitly made it
easier for foreigners to get automatic citizenship than tribal Indians. But
the underlying approach of Elk and Wong was
similar in that citizenship by birth depended more on geography than subjective
intent.
The most important lesson of Wong was this: the
Constitution's version of "allegiance" was the version we inherited
from Great Britain in 1776 – not versions prevailing in other countries or
under international law. This agrees with the independent conclusion in
my book, The Original Constitution: What It
Actually Said and Meant.
As modified by parliamentary statute, the British version of
allegiance was as follows:
* Birth in a country (or on a country's ships) normally creates a
"natural allegiance" to that country.
* A child born abroad is in allegiance to a country, and is
therefore natural born, only if his father is a citizen of
that country and not engaged in treasonous or felonious activities. In
Anglo-American law, a person's status usually followed that of the mother, but
for allegiance the rule was partus sequitur patrem.
* Foreign residents and visitors generally are in "local
allegiance" to the host country, since they submit themselves to its laws
and protection. Their children born in the host country are natural born
citizens of that country.
* To this last rule, there are two exceptions: When the father is
a foreign diplomat or a foreign invader, he has no allegiance to the host
country, and his offspring are not citizens.
Two justices dissented in Wong. They argued that
the British version of allegiance should not apply in America. They
contended that parents in merely local allegiance should not bestow
citizenship. For example, they stated that if a foreign power occupied
U.S. territory, the natural allegiance of parents should pass U.S. citizenship
to their children, even if those parents had a local duty to obey the
conqueror.
In my view, the Wong majority was right to hold
that the British version of allegiance applies to the original Constitution.
But because of developments between 1789 and 1868, the dissent made a
good argument that a newer, American version applied to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Supreme Court's third case was Plyler v. Doe (1982).
It ruled that a state's treatment of illegal aliens' children is
controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The
"subject to the jurisdiction" phrase was not at issue.
Nonetheless, the strongly liberal majority inserted a footnote reading in
part:
As one early commentator noted, given the
historical emphasis on geographic territoriality, bounded only, if at all, by
principles of sovereignty and allegiance, no plausible distinction with respect
to Fourteenth Amendment "jurisdiction" can be drawn between resident
aliens whose entry into the United States was lawful, and resident aliens whose
entry was unlawful.
In my opinion, this footnote has little or no persuasive power.
It merely recited the views of a commentator and was irrelevant to the
matter under decision.
So where does that leave us?
Let's assume that the Court does not overrule the Elk and Wong cases.
To rule against "birthright" citizenship, the Court would have
to find a third exception to the precept that children born in the U.S. are
U.S. citizens.
Those arguing in favor of citizenship will argue against another
exception. They may point out that, unlike a diplomat or an invader, an
alien who has violated immigration law still a duty to honor other U.S. laws.
In other words, unlike the diplomat or invader, the alien owes local
allegiance, and a father's local allegiance should be enough to grant
citizenship to his child.
Citizenship advocates also can point out that unlike in Elk,
our country has largely accepted the children of illegal aliens. Our
officials generally let them stay in the country and even provide government
benefits, such as drivers' licenses and public university tuition preferences.
Finally, advocates may argue that although the diplomatic and
tribal Indian exceptions were mentioned during the Fourteenth Amendment
debates, there was no mention of an exception for the children of Africans
illegally imported. This implies that such an exception does not exist.
Opponents of citizenship may compare the illegal alien to the
foreign invader whose mate produces a child in occupied territory. Both
enter the country illegally, and neither should profit from his own wrong.
This is different from the case of the captured slave, who is guilty of
no wrong. Opponents can add that official acceptance of residence is not
the same as acceptance of citizenship.
They may try to prove that illegal aliens often show no interest
in abandoning their original citizenship. Opponents may then argue that
the Wong dissent was correct to consider personal attitudes as
well as mere geographic location.
These questions will be vigorously litigated, as they should be.
My currComposeent bet is for the Court to rule in favor of citizenship.
Rob Natelson is senior fellow in constitutional jurisprudence at
the Independence Institute in Denver and author of The Original Constitution: What It Actually Said
and Meant. His research
is cited frequently in Supreme Court opinions and arguments.
Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2015/08/an_objective_guide_to_birthright_citizenship.html#ixzz3kPP1gqzV
Follow us: @AmericanThinker on Twitter | AmericanThinker on Facebook
The
surge in Mexican breeders in America’s open borders.
MEXICO'S
BIGGEST EXPORTS ARE: DRUGS, POVERTY, CRIMINALS and ANCHOR BABY BREEDERS FOR 18
YEARS OF GRINGO-PAID WELFARE.
*
“Through love of having
children, we are going to take over.” AUGUSTIN CEBADA, BROWN BERETS, THE LA RAZA
FASCIST PARTY
PREGNANT
WOMEN JUMP AMERICAN BORDERS FOR THE LA RAZA WELFARE PROGRAM TO ANCHOR AND
EXPAND MEXICO’S WELFARE STATE IN U.S. BORDERS
2003: Mexican population in U.S.
reported to have increased 10 percent in just three years, mostly as a result
of illegal immigration. Mexicans encouraged to breed at all costs. "A baby a year" Mexican pride slogan
emerges …EVERY ANCHOR BABY GETS MORE WELFARE FOR 18 YEARS. THAT CHILD IS ALSO
STILL A CITIZEN OF MEXICO!
The birthrate among
illegals is more than double that of legal US residents. The Pew Hispanic Center calculates that within
seven years, the children of immigrants, legal and illegal, will account for
one in nine school-age children in the US.
The birthrate among
illegals is more than double that of legal US residents. The Pew Hispanic Center calculates that within
seven years, the children of immigrants, legal and illegal, will account for
one in nine school-age children in the US.